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CHINA'S FIGHT FOR

NATIONAL LIBERATION
BY CJ%N LIN
zt two years now the Chinese people have staunchly
defended their country against the onslaught of the Jap
anese invaders. When the Japanese militarists on July 7,
193, p d e d an "in@da!P' in Liukouchiao, they had prepared, at one blow, to crush the Chinese Republic and turn
this great country into its wfony.
What they did not d o n on was that China would show
prolonged and determined resistance. The Japanese militarists assured everybody that the war would end with "lightning speed." By seizing Peiping, Tientsin and a number of
other important centers in North China, J a p strove to
"bring China to its knees," but it did not succeed in this.
Striving, however, to break the resistance of the Chinese
people by "a crushing Mow," the Japanese army penetrated
deep into the Northern Provinces of China and launched
an offensive on Shanghai.
T h e Chinese army is showing ever greater resistance to the
Japanese army. The military aim which the Japanese set
themselves--to defeat the Chinese army-did not materialize
even with the capture of such cities as Shanghai, Nanking,
Taiyuan and Tsingtao. This convinced the Japanese plunderm that China had no intention of capitulating but, OII
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the contrary, was firm in its will to defend its nationsl h d e
pendence and existence. It was then that the Japanese strategists adyanced a new phn of offensive, whose objectives are

.

W o w and Sian.

For the purpose of carrying out this plan the Japanese
command has at the pmeat moment concentrated vast n a d ,
air and land form in the Yangtze River valley in an effort
to reach Hzlnkow by river from the southeast. The present
drive is being undertaken because the plan of advance on
~ a n k o v pfrom the north-along the Peiping-Hdw Railway-has collapsed against the stubborn resistance of the
Chinese troops. The Chinese air force, grown strong in the
M e s against its adversary, is bombing Japanese war vessels, wh'ie the Chinese land forces, both regular and irregular, are conducting extensive operations on both banks
of the river. As a result, the Japanese advance has been delayed since the k g h h g of July.
The ~ a ~ a & splan
e of advance on Sian (Shensi Provinae)
has met with no better success. The fierce a t a s of the
Chinese troops in the adjoining province of' Shansi has
hindered the realization of this Japanese plan too.
Not rely* entirely on military force, Japan is actively
applying its ti-worn
methods of "sekiing China with the
hands of the Chinese themselves," using meKenary proJapanese elements among the bureaucracy and leading circles of the Chinese army. The Japanese militarists are acting through the traitors to the Chinese people, using primarily
the Trotskyite bandits in order to sow &belief among the
Chinese people in their own forces, fill them with terror of
Japanese imperialism, force Cbina to capitulate and abandon
armed resistance.
The Chinese people are only too well aware that the set
purpose of the Japan- aggression is to conquer the whoIe
of China and to transform its 450,00~,ooo population into
colonial slaves of Japanese imperialism. This confronts the
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Chinese people with one of two courses :resis-d
life,
or submission-and death. And the Chinese p p l e , in order
to preserve its independence and existence as a nation, has
decided to 6ght against the Japanese aggressors to the bitter end.
The intensity of the resistance of the Chinese people is
getting greater and stronger every day. As a result Japan's
new plan of offensive is also meeting with ever-growing
I
obstacles.
The attitude adopted ,bythe National government of China
on the question of armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors has undergoge considerable changes since the beginning
:, of the war. Consequently, this perid can raughly be divirlerl
into three stages.

THREE STAGES

OF ARMED

BESISXAMCE TO THE

JAPANESE ACCRE3SORS

lasted from the events in Liukouchiao
beginning of military operations in Shanghai.
characteristic feature of this stage was that the Chinese
government had not yet adopted a resolute position as regards dresistance to Japanese aggression.
The Chinese government still cherished the hope that the
"confict" could be solved by partial resistance and had no
firm intention of waging a war of defense an a national
scale. A number of prominent Chinese politicians were of
the opinion that at least five years, or under the best of circumstances not less than two years, would he required to
make premtions for a g e n d resistance on such a scale.
Although the National governmen* did order its troops to
North China, General Sung &-yuan attempted simultaneously to conduct peace negotiatims with Japan. Tbe Japanese aggressorstook advantage of these negotiations to bring
5
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up troops, rnske preparations for w r i n g Peiping and
Timtsin, and launch an oEensive on Shanghai.
The second stage lasted from the l x g h h g of operations
in Shanghai d l the fd of Taiyuan and Nanking. In this
period, the foremost people among the Chinese population,
pPrrtiwtarly the workers, soldiers and students, took up the
slogan of the Communist Party of China tbat all classes and
partiw in the wuntry should cohbtate in this sacred war
of nationorl liberation. Under pressure of the masses of the
people and with the Japanese army marching on Shanghai,
the M a t i d government of China adopted the policy of
orgauiting armed resistance on a nationat scale. A conference on national defmm was d e d , military areas apportioned, reserves mobilized and aonsiderable &n
of
troops dispatched to the f m t . This period marks the beginning of a bitter war of defense on the Shanghai front and
in North China.
Finally, the third staep--from the fall of Shanghai and
Nanking up to the present time-has been marked by wergrowing a c t i v i ~on the part of Gina's armed forces, offensive action and initiative cm the part of the Chimesc command, the gn>wth of partisan warfare and the extension of
the hse of the anti-Japanese national united front.
After the seizure of Nanking, Japan attempted, through
the medium of the German amhssador to China, to force
China to eapitdate. The propods of the Japanese aggresaors met with support among certain pro-Japanese dements
in China, who at tbat time were still holding government
positions. These pro-Japanese elements who were bent on
reaching a compromise, in conjunction with the Trotskyite
bandits, those outright agents of Japanese hpuialism in
China, tried to induce the government to conclude a sbarnefd m e . But the government and the commander-in-chief,
Chirrng Kai-shek, rejected the terms of v e n t offered
by Japan.
6
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This was a crucial rnoment for C h i . The Commdst
Party of China and the foremost and mmt far-*
leaders of the country were the decisive factors in fighting the
traitors and overcoming the waverings of those who, disheartened by by losses suffered by the Chinese army and
by the ~ a ~ offensive,
&
were inclined to adopt these shameful terms of apitulatim.
At this critical moment, the Communist Party proposed a
number of definite measures for strengthening the i d i e d
Chinese army. It proposed that a political department be
orgadzed attached to the general staff of the Chinese army ;
it actively helped to introduae universal military b c e and
devhped a widesiread anti-Japanese movement mong the
masses of the peqIe. The Conrmtmist Party proclaimed that
it was ready to render every help to the governmeat to set up
a defense industrg in China.
The example of the heroic struggle of the masses in the
North and in Central Chiua and the successful operations
of the Eighth Revolutionary People's Army exerted considerable influence on the commanders of the principal seetors
of the fronts, inducing them to display greater dekrmination
in offering armed resistance to Japan. The Communist
Party succeeded in rapidly concentrating the former Red
partisan detachments in the region of the central front and
forming them into a new m y - - t h e Fourth Army-which
was assigned to engage in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's
rear on the Nankhg-Hangd~m-Shanghaisector.
The appeal addressed by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party to the Chinese people, d n g u p them
to offer armed resistance in order to achieve a find victory
over the Japanese aggressors, met with warm support aad
a ready response araoag the m.
During this priod Chiang Ksi-shek issued aq appeal to
the people and the m y in which the gwerament aad the
army command proclaimed their readiness to offer mnsis7
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tent armed resistance to the enemy. Quite a number of
vacillating and irresolute commanders who had surrendered
a number of towns to the Japanese without showing any re
sistance were dismissed from the army. The ttaitor Hang
Fu-chu and a number of others whose treachery had undoubtedly facilitated the Japanese advance were shot. The
Chinese people regarded these measures of h e government
as an achievement "equivalent to a big victory in the field
and as a turning point in organizing determined resistance
to the enemy." The adoption of these measures put an end
to the activity of the compromising elements in the government apparatus. A poiitid departmqt headed by Genera1 Chen Qleng was set up at general headquarters.
Since the beginning of the war China bas suffered a
number of serious military reverses. The Japanese have
seized considerable territory in North and Central Chiria,
including a number of large cities-Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Taiyuan, Tientsin and Wuhu-the population of which
has k e n subjected to a reign of terror.
H o w m , the seizure of Chinese territory has cost the
Japanese very dear. According to the latest information,
Japan has already dispatched ~,troo,ooo men to China. The
losses suflered by the Japanese imperialists during the first
twelve months of its predatory war in China amount to
over 350,soldiers kilIed and wounded, no less than 6m
military planes and upwards of thirty war vessels. The war
of depredation in China is costing the Japanese about goo,-,yen a month.
In Japan the rise in prices and the repeated h m e in
taxes has considerably worsened the aonditions of the working masses. During the latter months of the war the t&
of the unemployed have been swelled by over half a d i m
people as a result of the dosing down of factories and the
atastrophk situation in the petty, semi-handicraft industries. The peasntry is in particularly d i h l t straits ;the labor
-8
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shortage in the countryside and the rise in prices, especially
in the prices of *a1
fertilizers, is briqimg in its wake
a reduction in the area sown under rice, resulting in slow
starvation. The chauvinistic frenzy of the early days has, in
the main, s e t itself. Deep dissatisfaction over the war is
making itse.1f felt in the country. Japan's man-pwer is limited, while the Mongolians and Manchurians conscripted in
these subjugated regions only too readily come to realize
that their place is on the other side of the front-among the
Chinese people who are fighting for their independence and
national liberation.

THE CAUSES OF CBINA'S M ~ I T A R YREVERSES DURING
THE..EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR
HE Ioss
a part of its territory can only be considered
a temporary reverse for China. It by no means decides

Tissue of of war.

the
The government, the people and dl the
=ti-Japanese political parties of China soberly estimate the
temporary reverses at the front and the important successes
which have already been won in the cause of the war of
defensq.
China suffered a number of military defeats during the
last century-in the opium war of I@, in the war of 18561857 against England and France,in the war of 1884 against
France, in the Sino-Japanese war of 1% and in rgor at
the time of the Boxer Rebellion The f eudd rulers of China
pursued a policy of capitulation to the conqueror. A general
fear of Japan grew up in China as a k u l t , and this feeling
undoubtedly did much to iduence the policy adopted by
the Chinese government during the &st period of the present war of defense. But tbis war of defense against f apsn
has roused all the people to fight for the integrity and indethe
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pendenaeofChh,~a~themtitlberentform
of the Chinese people, has Wed the government and the
army with coum.ge and detamhath, and has burst the
bubble of "Japmophobia!'
What is the cause of China's temporaryrary
reverses and
loses in this war?
Zmperi9list Japan made Ieagthy mans to d t
China, arming itself to the teeth. Cbina, on the other hand,
was a semidonid comtiy relatidy poorly armed and
poorly prepared for defense. And in order to offer successful resishce to the enemy it had to reorganize ia the prmess of the war.
A fact ~f major importance h 6 n g the first s e e of the
war wa! that for a long time China lacked internal unity.
In addition, a number of s t r a w and political ern>=
were c o m m i ~ d .In tbe *st place, the mnese govemmmt
\
did not h e d i a t e l y resolve to offer determined armed reI
sistmce, and this enabled its adversary ta m t r a h it8
fmops on Chinese territory, while China had not yet momized dl its armed foxes to resist the enmy. Then
the
capture of such shtegic poinb as Peiping and Tientsk en&led the Japatlese army to hunch aa p f h s i v e westwardti
and southmrds d&g the Tientsin-Fdmw, P4pi.g-Hdow
aad Peiping-Suiyuan railways.
&ring the fvst stap of the war the chin- a&
mnW itself mostly to methods of WVO
deftme htdof
resorting to active defense, combining trench warfare with
that of tactid methods. As long as it m n h d itself solely
to trench warfare, the Chinese army, outdasd by the enemy
in t e c h i d equipment, was unable to defcat it.
Another ckumstance ofvery considerable import was that
political work was not m u d 4 on a sdlkknt sale among
the m a w of the papahtion. At the beg.inniag of the l ~ a r
of defense the Chinese gov-t
did mt display the
nemmry determination in combating p m Japanese elements

-
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and traitors; nor were the progressive elements of the m u lation d s t e d in active work to a s&cient degree. In spite
of tfie insistence of the Communist Party and a number of
other organizations in Cbina,not df the anti-Japanese grottp
ings and parties have been enlisted in active work in the
anti-Japanese mtianaI united f m t .
In the course of this war of defense, especially after the
Japanese occupied Nanking, China achieved a number of
important successes which enabled its army to display more
initiative and =ti+,
organizing successful resistance to
the Japanese invaders.
In the first place, the war against Japan gave rise to a
degree of internal unity ttnpncedenkd in the history of
China. Ever since the Manchu dynasty was overthrown in
191I China has been the scene of constant internal wars
among the miBtarists, and beginning with IW, when collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party ceased, the scene of a dvil war that lasted ten years.
A political struggle was also in p r o p s between the central
government of China and the local authorities.
The war of defense against Japan has welded together
the progressive politid parties of China, established a better understanding between the central government and the
local authorities, enhanced the prestige and the power of the
national goverument, and improved relations between the
government and the people.
One of the foremost acbiwements of the war of defense
against J a w is the radial change in the policy of the
Chinese govemmt.

TBE RADICAL CHANGE IH THE POLICY OF THE
CHTNESF WVERMMENT

amms kfore the pres~ntwar of defense the Chinese
Wgovernment
pursued
policy of compromise and
a

capitulation with iegard to the Japanese aggressors, and
within the country conducted an armed struggle against the
Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army, now the policy of eapitutation to Japan Iras been replaced by one of resistance, and the policy of fighting the Chinese Red Army
and the Communist Party by a policy of collaboration with
them, a policy of rallying all groups and organizations which
are devoted to the interests of the national independence of
China and are striving for the economic and cultural eahancernent of the entire country. The Chinese government is
today beeoming a genuine government of national defase.
Dernocmiic measutes are King introduced as far as possible in the interests of strengthening the country's defenses :
a number of emtrgeney laws have been repealed, certain liberties have been granted to the mass organizations, mass meetings are held on questions of national defense. After the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party coneludd an agreement on the establishment of an anti-Japnese national
united front, the government released about 30,- political
prisoners, many of them Communists.
The stmggIe that bas begun against traitors and saboteurs
in the g o v m e n t apparatus is also a big step forward.
A National PoliticaI Council has been established, the
first session of which was held July 6-15, 1938. Although
this council is not yet a fully representative organ of the
whole of the Chinese people, nevertheless, its very establishment, together with the introduction of elementary demo12
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cratic Iiberties, is a considerable step forward on the road
to democl.abtioa
The National Political C o d 1 is composed of representativa of all the provinces of China including those which
have been seized by the Japanese, representatives of all plitical parties and organizations (including seven of tbe
leading figures of the Communist Party of China : Mao Tsetung, Wang Ming, Tsing Pan-sing, Lin Chu-han, W u
Yui-chan, Tung Pi-wu and Teng Yinehao), several representatives from the young people's party, the All-Chinese
A s k a t i o n of N a t i d Salvation (a mass anti-Japanese
orgsnizaticm which arose in rm).the Party .of National
Socialists, peasant societies, military cides, etc. The task of
the council is to master. China's most able and leading sons
to help the government in its guidance of tbe country and
the war. The representatives of the Communist Party on the
Co~mciJstated in their letter that :

..

I'.
the establishment of the National Political Cwncif during the war of liberation evinces that the plitiml
life ofChitla is p&g
towards democracy and that
the uuited front of the prties and the people is developing still. further. . . . We Communists, having in mind
the possibility of developing tbe C o d 1 into a genuine
body of people's representatives, will enthusiastically
and sincerely participate in its work." *

A most important result of the anti-Japanese national
united front has beet, the organization of a single national
army. Formerly the Chinese army was a weapon in the hands
of the various militarists for the purpose of carrying on
. i n b & e warfare. The local troops were not subordinate

* ScQ "&chation by Communism, Memhra of the Nationd Political &undof China, p. 6 1.
13
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to the wntd mtunand The provincial troopsadidnot possess properly trained o%cers, their equipment was not uniform, was tlflaqually distributed, and eo m.

'1

Numerically, tke Chinese army is one of the largest in the
world. The forces subordinate to the central government in
1936 included 148 divisions and q8 special brigades of infantry, f i e artiilery brigades, 21 artillery regiments, a d
five engineering regiments. Including its auxiliary forces and
aviation, the Chhese army i n ~ ~ totthee central govmtment n u m M r,p,ooo men. The provincial troop
consisted of about 60 bodies of troops (bripdes and divisions) rmdxrhg ~ , o a omen; fmmmIy these units were
actually not aabordhate to the central command,
After the war against Japan started, a u n i s e d ~ ~
m y waa established for the first time, which has sitace lxcome a genuine srmy of national defense The p'ovincial
troops wtre mobilized for active senice at the front and
placed under the orders of the catraI command. After Hang
Fu-chu and a n u m b of other hitom were shot, relations
between the local authorities and the c e a w command improved considerably, and the prestige of the unified high
command was d a d
The m y ha^ become a genuine national army. The defense of the country-that is what constitutes its i d d , its
task. h e is the old type of soldier who for the sake of
higher pay left the service of one militarist to throw in his
lot with another. The Chinese soldier of today dacIares
proudly : "I am a soldier of the people." Its discipline, its
contact with the population, its conrage and devotion to the
national muse, have won the army great prestige. T'he time
when the population was terrified at the arrival of army
uaits in their district is now a thing of the past. Today the
population gives them a cordial welcome, organizes auxiliary detachments and wages s joint struggle against the aggressors. These changes in the sentiments of both the people
14

--and the men are a major factor in the M e n s ~d the-cormtry and the dedopmcnt of the future detumde Cb*.
Of prime h p t a n c e is the ahdomuat of the f m r
methods of wive defense, traditional for the old Ctrimse
army, for more active operations. Today the Chinese atmg
coordinates trench warfare and tactical maneuvering on the
flanks with the activities of the partisan detdments k the
rear of the enemy. Thanks to these methods the Chinese
forces successfully held up for a Iong time the enemy's
progress on tht Northern and So&
sectors of the
T i e n h - M o w railway and won a number of victories near
Taierbchwang. Inathepxoviace of S W i C&iang Kai&ek
c m h d he Chinese
to remain om the Northern bank
of the Hwg-ha, and although the Japanese have approadd
-the river, tkey dare not cross for in their rear are considerable ,Chinese forms which con8tantly hams them and
strike blow after blow at tfieir lines of comtnunic~tion.
And here, in t
h rear.of the J a w army, the Chimx
m e , on the h i s af the collaboration o* the KuominWg
and the IConumdst Farty, have driven the Japanese frwn
a vast territory and restored the authority of the Chinese
. g o v ~ t Over
.
forty counties with a population of from
five to six million people have k united under Chinese
authority in the bwder regim of Shansi, Hop& and Chahar
provinces, in the MU of the Japanese. In Apd, rg38, a secand "htdHopeh Government" was set up in the center
of the p v k e - These g o m e n t s , having organized a
popular army of m,m men, are keeping the Japanese
nar and lines of commtmi(;~tionunder constant threat, and
are extendig their territory and organizing the population
for the struggle against the aggressors.
The Chinese army can also l o r d a number of achievements in improving the t&*cal
knowledge of its forces,
Pditical work which is now being consi~tentlyconducted in
the army has served to enhance the politid x m p n and
15
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national self-ccmsciousness of the officersand men.; &mipline has k e n strengthened. The traditions of the provincial
troops of the militarists are gradually disappearing.
The Chinese government devotes particular attention to
supplying the army with u p b d a t e equipment and establishing reserves. It is successfully purchasiing equipmeat
abroad and at the same t i n e carrying out measures to estabh h a munitions industry, as well as other industries, in the .
interior regions of Chink Thanks to the devotion and heroic
effort of the Chinese workers the government succeeded in
evacuating a number of important enterprises from districts
which wwe in danger of being o m p i e d by the J a p e s , and
subsequently were partly occupied. The b& arsenals in Nanking, Fmhow and other cities were evacuated in p d time.
The Chinese army now pomaaes an air force distinguished
by its exceptional d a k and initiative; its losses are invariably less than those of the many. The high ideological
and politicaI qualities of the Chine* air force, its splendid
technique and daring were demonstrated to the world in the
flights, unparalleled in the history of China, by Chinese airmen over the territory of Formosa and over big cities and
ports in Japan, when Chinese airphnes sattered IeaAets calling upon the civil population to resist the war of plunder
against China, which is spelling ruin to the Japanese people.
T h e Chinese government is incrasing and reinfoxing its
army by forming a number of new divisions and introducing
universal niiitary service to replace the former system of
hiring soldiers. The methods of guerilla warfare, repeatedly
proposed by the Communist Party of China, have been
adopted an a large scale. Regular army units are mare and
more being used for this purpose in the enemy's rear; the
partisan movement is being organized extensively among the
local populatiwn. The partisan movement is developing not
only in the zone of operation of the Eighth Army on the
Northern front but also in Shantung, Kiangsu and Che

16
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kiang. The Japanese army L in constant danger of p w t k - ~
attacks on ?he citia, d w a y s and mads it h occupied This
compefs the Japanese to. maintain large forces in the rear
for combating the partisan units. Taking into consideration
the Japsne8~I& of m e r y e s for conducting large scale
operations in the main directicms, this, of course, adds to
their permanent difficultits.

THE EIGHTH REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S AILMY AND THE
SPECIAL flISTRICT OF THE -PUBLIC OF CHINA

far-famed Eighth Route
has all along played
T
enormous part in
the radical
of the Chinese
in establishing fishting
of the
Army

HE

decting

an

army,

reorganization

m y
Chinese people, welded by its single command and its single
aim of struggle against the Japanese aggressors.
This atmy, formed from the r m b of the former Chinese
Red Army, has behind it ten years of experience in conducting a successfid tacticat and pa&an warfare under the
most difficult conditions, often ending in victory over the
many times superior e n m y pitted against it. The Eighth Route
Army grew up and was tempered in a constant, arduous and
heroic struggle with the result that it has accumulated a
d t h of b e u c e in revolutionary warfare. The Eighth
Route Army bas perfect mahitery of the qdfk mehods of
conducting an armed struggle againat an enemy superior in
a

teehaid eqai*.
This is based on the skillful combination of trench warfare, tactical maneuvering and guerilla
warfare, Gaining from the cxpience of the Eighth Army,
the entire Chinese army is mastering thw methods, as a
restdt of which the betterquipped, splendidly trained army of
Japan, which had been m a h g preparations for war for a
&n
of years, annot achieve the sucess~~
it had expected.

17

The Eighth Army began operations against the invaders
under very dii%eult conditions, Its equipment m oamparat i d y out of date and not uniform; it lacked not only heavy
artillery, b k s and aviation but even mountain guns. The
glorious victories won by the Eighth Army are due largely
to the politid ~sciousnem,discipline and enthuslam of
its men, the flexible e c s and able Idership of b eotnmanders, the daring and determination of all its cornhatants.
In 1937,immediately after the e v e m in Liukouchiao the
Eighth Army addressed a request to the C b i government tbat they be sent out against the Japanese aggresors,
and w h a very tense Jtuation arose in North China in
August, 1937,the Eighth Amy, mdcr Chu Teh, was transferred to the Morthcrn p t of S h s i province*
The dispatch of the Eighth Army to the front attracted
gentral attention axld a r d eaormoas e t l t b r s s h among
the peopfe and the Chinew m,
From the fist day of h
i arrival at the front the Eighth
Army command toolr the following fundammtal pridples
as the basis of its qmatims and of politid wurk among the
masses.
The first basic principle is that the army must wage war
on the lines of tactical and p h action, abandoning the
trench warfare f rmtal defense tactics exdusivefy applied
formerly throughout the Chinese army ;it must strike at the
enemy's t h k and r a r ; it must launch a p t k n war in
the immediate and distant rear of the emmy; destroy its
Lines of c o m m ~ t i o n stxikc
,
at tk reinfoicements the enemy dmws up, and c m ~ t itse own a d m u with those of
the other Chinese units. The commaad of the Eigfith Afmy

~tWttO8htherestofthtChinese~themect
strategy and tactics in the war against Japan.
TIE second
principle is incmxd a d * ia organizing and atming the local population and mblishiqg rallying centers of @sari *fare in the eoemy's
The par-

@

-.

tisan actions of the people must be combined with tlmohic of
the regular army. The command of the heroic Eigbth Route
Army, and the Communist Party, which @ed
it and
i m w it, are proving hactual fact that only by mobihhg
and orgdnizi the masses, by launching a @m war with
the active participation of the broad masses
the Chinese
people offer Iastiq resistance and achieve vicbry over the
J a p e s e aggressors. The measures taken by the 'Eighth
Army directed the attention of the government and of the
other Chinese army units towards organizing the masses of
the people and developing the partisan movement in all distri& in the vicinity of the front.
The third basic principle is political work within the army,
close contact with the local population and inmssd d v ity in disintegrating the forces of the enemy.
Due to the enormous work that is berng done in the Eighth
Army, the able leadership of Chu Teh, the energy of the
political department, the commissars and the Conrmrmist
Party organizat~om,the Eighth Army has succeeded in
creating a mighty core to serve all the armed forces of
China.
The victory which the Eighth Army won at Pinghsinkuan
(September q-a7,1937) was china's first big victory in the
war against Japan. The Eighth Army mashed the finest
Japanese di&ion--the Fifth TXvisi-dy
wiping
out one of 'its brigades. After this successful operation it
penetrated into the enemy's rear, surrounding its Rsnks and
cutting off the Japanese communications in the Northern
part of Shansi province. While other units of the Chinese
army continued activities on the front, the Eighth Aimy was
active in the enemy's rear. It captured over a thousand motor trucks and destroyed twenty-one airplanes ;together with
the partisans, the Eighth Army forces struck at the ememy
reinforcements. As a result, over w,ooo Japrrnese troops
stationed in the vicinity of Sinkw (north of Taiyuan) were
19

left witbout ammunition, fuel, and food supplies. Their artillery and tanks were put out of action. The enemy could
&ah only very d quantities of food suppliesa d mu&
tians by air. Thus, during the severe fighting in the vidinity
of Sinkou, which went on for over twenty days, the Eighth
Army placed the memy in a very di&utt position.
The Eighth Army is strong because of its mobility. The
characteristic fature of most of the commanders is their
initiative and the fact that they are accustomed to take in&
pendent action. The Eighth Army can rapidly concentrate its
forces to carry out some Wg opatim, but it can equally as
welt break up into small units to a"y on partisan warfare.
The Eihtb Army oftax s d s in defeating forces superior in nwtlber. It skillfully applieg the method of a sudden
flank attack on the enemy, as a result of which the enemy's
losses arc usually -era1 times as great as its own.
On one occasim when h o companies of the Eighth Army
were acting m the rear of an enemy unit of over 3,000 men.
the enemy d d not achieve success although in the course
of a single day it fired over I,W sheUs and suffered at least
500 casualties. On another -ion
a single company of the
Eighth Army succeeded in defeating a Japanese unit o f
a h ~600
t men without itself suffering any casualties. A battalion of the Eighth Army d e d out a night attack on a
strongly p m k t d Japanese air field, and after a hand-tohand fight with the guards destroyed twenty-one enemy
planes.
The diary of a Japanese'd?icer who was taken prisoner
by the Eighth Army had the following entry: 'When we
come :u against the Eighth Army our heads begin to whirl,
because it always appears suddedy and me a n never tell
when it d l come or go."
When it finds itsdf at a disadvantage, the Eighth Army
strives to avoid big losses and effects a swift h t , in
order to d m on the enemy and deliver hhh a crushing blow.
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of the Chinese fqms and f i l l d w ' d d i l
the assmalacemofv i c t q . Tbe tach of tht E3ghth
enable the ~ b e Chinew
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units at, study in p d t e how hap-t
it is to combine trench warfare with factid mavers and partisan w a h . The Eighftr Army is
ling the J a p m ta abandon the OUtflanIcing.
which
they wtlIy apply against Chinese W p ,since by the Chinese sudden
atlacks it often wipes out entire enemy
unlts. The E i t h Army has c m q e b d the Japehie to satter thcir fand withdraw kge units fmaz the froat tO
guard camnunidom in the rear,
D d q the m a t i o n s in the north of S b s i province the
Eighth Army has never fora moment r e b e d its wmk of
orgadhg and
the masses. I n consequence of its intensive politid and edrntional w r k , large anti-Japan=
d u t i e s of National Salvation, a pasat league, a women's
league* trade d o n s , self-defense &a&ments and other
mass arpdzations h v e been established ia the cdurse of
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The Eigha Route A m y has assigned a group of ib men,
Ioag experkncecl in o
w partisan warfare, to work
among the laad population. These cadres lead the numerous
partisan detachmats formed in the region of its operati*
bytbt~udpopuhtioaThe~unitsarea~not
mlywaholdgunsandrifim left behind attime by the
Chinese trw, but to a certain dent also with modem
arms captuPed from the enemy, The partisans are often short
of arms, of warm clothes, and medial supplies, but in spitz
of &is the number of these units is m t l y growing, gaining in experience and strength, aad profiting by their many
e n m e with &e enemy,
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been created n & i
from 5 m to 6,- men each
A military Hea headquarters has also been set up to provide
a united command for these peutisan units. This partiarea shows how new wits should be formed in the enemy's
rear, Partisan units often appear around Peiping, they tear
up the tracks of the Peiphyi-Hankow railway, make surprise
attacks on the Japanese forces around Tientsin and the
Tientsin-Pokow railway, aad strike telling W s on the
b
y
e

enemy*

One of the most important results of the &pan struggle
waged by the Eighth Route Army is that the other armies,
profiting by its experience, have also begun to develop a
partisan struggle in the enemy's ma. Numerous courses to
train leaders of partisan units have been &d
in the
other armies. The Eighth Army often receives requests from
other armies to supply instructors on fht tactics of partisan
warfare. Thanks to the Eightb Army the partisan movement has come to play an important part in the war of h i
eration tbat China is waging against the Japanese invaders.
The Eighth Army has retained its splendid traditions as
regards political work among its personnel. Politically its
men are considerably better developed than the soldiers in
tbe other Chinese form. The men of the Eighth Army ah
quite clear as to the aims of the war of liberation against
Japan, they redize perfectly that only prolonged armed resistance can bring victory o& the Japanese invaders, Political work in the units of tbe Eighth R a t e Army is conducted both on the march and dnring active service. The
army implicitly obeys the orders of its commanders; it
b w s no
of desertion. The relatiom between the cornmanders and the men axe those of friends and comrades.
Every regbent or other brge unit of the Eighth Army
has its politid dqmtmmt; the battalions have poIitid instructors; the mpzmies, politid leaders; and the rqimen& brigadca and dividons, politid cammishlpnr. The p
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Iitical leaders and military command of the Eighth Route
Army, beginning with the W i m wnnmndtrs, d of
Comrmmists. Communist nuclei exist in all the units of the
Eighth Army. The Commmists make up abut m p r eent
of the army, which consists largely of workers and
A third of its wmmandm and men consists of workec~,
artisans and laborers, and the rest of pmr and middle F
ants and intellechrals.
The degree of activity and the internal unity of the
Eighth Army arouse the respect of other army units. A Ku*
mintang newspaper correspondent who visited the Eighth
A m y headquartets to interview Chu Teh wrote in his
article:

..

'Wh~hetlI reaehed the gates of the Eighth Army headquarters, I saw an old man dressed in a private's uniform. This spectacled old man was reading a newspaper"The Chief of Staff introdud me to Chu Teh, and I
was surprised at his simple and cordial manners. I had
dinner with him; the food was the same as that served
to all the men in the army. I talked to the men and to
the wok and m e to the conclusion that in the Eghtb
Route Army everybody, beginning with the commanderh&ef and ending with the rank-andde men, the
m k s and the stablemen, is bound by one common cause.
1 was mnch impwith the esBrif ds corks of the
Eigbtb Army and the educational work conducted in it!'
The Eighth Army devotes. parti&
attention to demoralizing the enemy forces. The army's politid dqmment
publishes large numbers of l&ts and pamphlets in Japanese, Mongolian, l Q l m s e and Korean. The I o d ppuMon,
the partian detachments, and also airplanes distribute thidi
literature in the districts occupied by tbe Japanese. All the
m m d m and mm study Japanese in order to carry on
agitation answg the e h m y fwces and to talk to the prison23

ers. In its appeals to the Japanese soldiers tbe Eighth Route
Army poinb out that victory for the Japanese rnilibrists will
only worsen the condition of the Japanese workers and peasants, while the defeat of military fascist Japan will set free
the fortes of revolution and enable the working people of
Japan to throw off the yoke of feudal -pitorlist exploitation.
T h e Eighth Army exhorts the Japanese soldiers to ponder
over what they are giving their lives for m the fields of
China and to turn their bayonets against their age-old oppressors, against the militarists.
"Japanese sotdim,'' one of these leaflets says, ''come
over to as! We will bat yon well. Do not lay down
your fives in the interests of the Japanese militarists!
Let WJ d u d e an alliance between the Japanese soldiem and the C b m soldim, let us put an end to the
war 1"
These leaflets put out by the Eighth Route Army are often found on Japsnese prisoners4 and w the bodies of those
killed. Some of the Japamse prisoners of war help to write
the I d W and pamphlets in Japanese and even ask to be
allowed to stay in the Eighth Army and allow their families ,
to come to China to avoid persecution on the part of the
Japan= government.
A Japanese soldier by the name of Nahmura who was
taken prisoner by the Eighth Army was certain that he
would be put to deafh. He had been =red by the fabrications published in the Japanese,press that the Chinese show
no qrsarter to prisoners of m.After he had h for some
time in the district of opedons of the Eighth Atmy, Nakamum wrote an appeal to the Japanese d i e m in which he
asserted that the men of the Eighth Route Army 'Ytreated
him like a brother!' He wrote :
"The Eighth Army is m army of workers and peas- I
ants, in whit& dl are weIded by the common aim of
struggle. I am moved to p r o f w d admiration by this
%

,

army. Japanese brothers! Why do we have to leave our
wives and children and &&ce
ourselm in this war of
aggression? We are waging this war in the interests of

the landlords, capitalists and impcdjsh. Let us revolt
against this blaody slaughter1 k t us turn our a r m
@st
the militarists and overthrow their domination!
Brothers! I hope &at in the near future you will all
shaJse the hands of our brothers, the men of the Eighth
Army. I am grateful to the Eighth Army for the help it

has given me."

The Eighth Route A m y has established very friendly relations with the l d population. Before billeting their mea
in the homes of the Iocal inhabitants, the c o ~ d e r ask
s
their consent. If any property is damaged in the houses
w k e men of t4e Eighth Army are billeted, the m e r s are
compensated in money. The pophiion everywheie cordially
d c o m e the men of the Eighth Atmy, invite them to their
bnmes, g k e them food and bring them gifts. Oftheir own
accord tfrey rep& the roads and assist in transporthg supplies and ammunition in order to facilitate the movemwfs
of the Eighth Route Awy.
q p g m e n t s the local
population help to transport the wounded and the trophies
seized.

The Eighth Army has acquired considerable experience

ia re~vitingnew men As a muIt of the g w d ieIations it
tsbblbheg with the 1 4 population, its recmiting c&paigns meet with warm support among the people. It! the
northwestern part of China one often hears people say:
*When I join up I'm going to enlist in the Eighth Route
Army. The Eighth Army has no m r a I punishment, and
it knows how to fighLn The temuiting campdgns are usually
conducted by special groups uuder the charge of politid
workers who carry on a vast amount of educational and
mass work among the paplation.
These methods of replenishing the d s - - b y means of
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mass agitatioaal work among the pqhtiobeing
widely practised now dl over .China As a d t considerable
reserves have a h d y been organized.
Realiziag the advantages of these methods, the Chmese
go-ent
is gradually abandoning the system of pressing
men into the service.
These new methods are being most successfully applied
in the S W District of the Republic of China. The S@
District, organized from what were formerly the Soviet districts, has a fairly large territory. All the peasants have been
apportioned land and last year, as a result of the efforts of
the government of the S p e d District and the peasantry,
the area sown was increased by aus pw cent. On the initiative
of the pnpufation a st& of grain for the Eighth Army was
established in a very short time.
The workers in the S p e d District are organized in trade
uinons with a membership of 3 5 , ~The
. printing plant, #e
arsenal, the needIe shops and various other enterprises b+
long to the government. The population of the SpeciaI District indudes also a large number of handicraftsmen. The
young people here are organized in the Union far the Sdvation of the Country which has a membership of over 60,ooo.
The Pioneer organization numhrs over p,m children.
The Communist Party set itself the aim of making &e
SpeciaI District a model democratic district. In this it has
k e n successful, and the SpeuaI District is now an imporb n t link in the general system of the u d b t i o n of all China
The government bodies of the Special District are elected
democratically, with the Communist and Kuomintang organizations prticipating. At the present time, intensive military
training is going on throughout the D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
.In case of n*
cessity the d t s formed in tfie Special District mn be mdilbed as reinferremeats for the Eighth Route Army. The
self-defense units of the Special District number over loo,ooo men, and the Young Guard units 50,000.
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The S p e d Datrict has a pas of Its o w a The uu@m
Chkhfoprg, pubIisbed & Yenan, the capital of the S&d
Districtl enjoys great popularity throughout China. At the
end of last year this magazine was the first tp publish the Ten
P h of t h Program fat. Resisting lames@I s n p d d h
md Sm'w the C
,
proposed by the Communist Party
of China, wbich were later reprinted by many Chinese papers
and were met with warm response and approval at the front.
The growing influence and prestige of the Communist
Party of China, wbich initiated and consistently p d c i p f e s
in the anti-Japlrnese national united front, are rdected first
and foremast in the Communist Party press and the press
of China's national: united front.
The Chkwmg, the organ of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, x d e s a circulation of 30,and can
he seen all over China. In January, 1938, the Gmmunin
Party hgan to publish a daily newspapr, the H s i ~Huu Jik
Pao, which reached a circulation of 5 0 , m after one month
and is now the most widely read paper in China,
Recently, the political department of the Eighth Route.
Army began to publish a weekly alled Thr Varsglcap.d. Withm a v e q short time the drculation of this w&y mounted
to 10,copies. The vast majority of the magazines p u b
lished in Shanghai, before the city was sized by themJapaneae, popularized the policy and the measures advmted by
the Gmmuaist Party in the war of defense against J a m
Over tbirty mapzincs of the same trend a p m r in R h w .
Numerous newspapers and magazines pubIished in Cantm,
Chungking, Chengtu, S n and other cities readily print
articles by Communists and popularize the p r t played by
the Communist P a q in the anti-Japanese national united
front An over the country the people &ow particular interest towards pamphlets and articles ddiag with the Eigbth
Army. A vey popttlar pamphlet8 which was pubIished in a
mass d t b 8 is that by Chu Tch, on the & of and life
a7

-

1

.
-

in the Eighth Army. Quite a n m h r of publishing h o r n
themseIves reprint in pamphlet form articles from the Cornmunist newspprs and magazines, since sach pi@dt?ts
rapidly acquire popularity aft over the mantry and are very
good sellers.
On the initiative of the Cmmuaist Party of C h i a new
army--the Fourth Army-under
the command of Yeh
Ting, has been Mganized from the partisan units which up
till recently operated in the various former Soviet districts
of .Central and Swth China (the provinces of Kim&,
Fukien, (Chebng, Anhwei, Huttan, Hupeh and Kwangtung).
These partisan units remained in the districts when the
main forces of the Chinese R d Army moved further west
three or four years ago. They acquired a d t h of experience in &san
warfare under the most d i w t conditions.
At the present time the major part of the Fourth Army
is concentrated in the vicinity of Nanking, Wuhu, Shanghai
and Hangchow. Another section is opemthg to the north
of the Y-e.
A mass partisan movement is developing
with particular intensitg in the regioa of operations of the
Fourth Army where recruiting for new unib is ptocteding
with p t s u m .
In July, the Fourth Army, in connection with the Japanese advance up the Yangtze River, begau operations on
a pdiMlfarIy wide d e in a most important sector-the
triangle Shmghai-Nanking-Hangchow.The purpose of the
Fwrth Army's maneuver is not only to weatsen the rear of
the Japanese, which is of rid importance to them since it
is through Shanghai and Hangchow that the Japanese supply
the central front with munitions and reinforcements, but
also to attack them on a wide front from the east in order
to weaken their offensive on Hadrow.
Between July ro and July 14,new large units under the
command of Han Y
i
n
g broke thmgh the Japmsc line of
&

a

defense in the Sbghai district. Severe %htiog tbok p h
in the immediate M t y of Shanghni (Pootmg) and nChankchow-aa important station on the Manking-Shghi
railway. As a result of the stubborn fighting in this district
Fourth Army units crossed the railway and tore up the
track for several miles.

TIIE CHINESE PmPLE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
THE JAPAN&SE INVADERS

of millions of
T
toll of the
the will

ENS
Chinese people are participating in
the war against the Japanese. In spite of the heavy
war,
to resist Japanese aggression
and the determination to defend the national indepndence
of China at whatever cost are growing among the Chinese

people.

In its war against the Chinese people Japanese imperialism is resorting to the mast atrocious and barbarous me&
ods, endeavoring to break the resistme of the population
by inspiring them with a horror of war, In ucmpied districts
the Japanese troops set fire to houses, ruthless1y shoot down
the civil population, sack homes and rape the Chinese women.
The civil population of defenseless towns and villages is
being subjected to the most vicious bmbardrnents.
In retaliation for the activities of the partisans the Japanese army ruthlessly razes entire towns and villages, shoots
down the inhabitants who have remained behind, and all
who live on either side of the railways and highroads.
In a certain small town of 3,inhabitants in Shansi

province, the Japanese slaughtered over 2 , m , incIudiig
even children, two and three years old. In a village with a
population of over one hundred the Japancse either slew or
burned ewry person in the town, regaxdless of sex or age.

w

After the fall of Nanking the Japanese shot ovm 40,non-ta,
The raping of Chinese women b a 4
m m c e whenever the Japanese seize a Cbinese town or
vim. In An& county, Hangchow district, the Japanese
army of mcupation ran amtlek aad burned down h o s t dI
the large villages. Over
villages were rstzed by them in
the vicinity of Paoting, Hopeh Province. Equally common
is the looting of the Japanese army. For six days the Japanese looted the a d trading town of M o , Hopeh Province. At1 the shops and stores were robbed and wrecked. The
Japanese carted away from the t o m 50O,x1o Mexican dollars' worth of goods, a large part of which they had to a h dm on the mid to saw their skins from the partisans who
gave pursuit.
Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai were pithgal, and
many d m , including some in the chmge of foreign
missionaries, were demolished. Wbole trains and shiploads
of
arc being shipped to Japan from Shanghai, Nanking md Taiyuan.
The shooting of non-combatants, the air raids, violence
and looting of the Japanese army arouse the profound indignation and hatred for the Japanese plunderers among the
Chinese people. In the &ids near the front and in '
those oocupiwf by the enemy, the population is rising against
Japan, engaging in the most varied forms of struggle a d
displaying the greatest persistma and heroism. '
A mass movement to defend the country is growing
throughout Cbhm
The part of vanguard in this movement is played by the
working cIass, p d c d a r l y the workers in the war indllstries and transport. Disregarding thc danger and the sacrifices involvtd, the workers repair the railway lines and
bridgw w e d by the hbardmmts, thus ensuring ditary traaspts for the Chinese m y .
The workers of Shaghi, Shantung, Peiping arnd of a
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number of railways in districts uc&d
by the -.a
voluntarily organizing partisan units and are acthe h tbe
a n t i - J a w mass o r g a ~ During
~ . the defense of
Shanghai the Shanghai workers organized d t s for &ting the C b e army and actively helped them to defend the
city. Though ladriog in military experience, those units, at
a critkd moment in the fighting, independently attacked the
enemy and mptured its machine-gun positions.
The pawants in the war zone and in the districts behind
the enemy's fine are also taking an active part in the war of
defense agdmt the Japanese. In the war zone they perform
work of the greatest i m m , supplying the army with
horses and arts, ~
&
gammunition, supplies, and
the wounded, buifdig fortifications and repairing roads.
Large n u m b of m t s join the partisan units and other
armed organizations in the enemy's rear. In some provk e 8 a widapread peasant movement has developed ; the
peasants undergo military training as is the a,
for example, in the proviraces of Kwanghtng and K v i . But in a
number of other provinces this is not yet done to a suffiuent extent.
The Chinese intelligentsia, particularly the students, are
also playing a sqdicant part in the anti-Japanese movement. The studcntrs are taking an active part in the organizations for m a t i d &ation, are conducting widespread agitational and organization1 woxk to mobilize the masses, and
are joining the Chinese army in groups. At the present time,
large numbers of students who have enlisted in the national
sky are being trained as quickly as W b l e ; some of them
are also being trained for politid work in the army, others
have joined the anks and the partisan units.
A specid organhtiion of c~ltwalworkers which includes
university professors, writers, actors and teachers exists in
Hankow. Tbis mganktion publishes cheap mam editions
of litwature, a h &book.
Its agitators and theatrical
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troupes tour the fronts giving k t u f e s and presenting plays
to the men.
T h e poor people of the t o m arc joining the m y , particularly in the districts threatened by the Japanme invaders. The wonien, too, and even the children, are taking an
active part in the anti-Japanese movement; they have organized large numbers of Units for Aiding the Front, and
kave collected gifts for the men; they are organizing medical service for the wounded, and traveling dramatic performmces for aghtional and educational putposes at the
front. A Pioneers' h t i c circle was formed in Shanghai
of the children of workers and poor people, school children
between the ages of eight and eighteen ;notwithstanding the
danger involved, this circle visits the front, performing its
agitationd skits before the troop and the 1-1 population.
The workers, p s a t s and the bourgeois sections
of the town population are taking an active part in organizing armed resistan= to the Japancse aggresggrs.
The raatidnal bourgeoisie of China has, since the kginning
of the war of defense against Japan, been in favor of fighting the Japanese invaders. It ddesirts victory over Japan,
but lacks sufficient confidence in the possibility af a final
victory. The Chinese bourgeoisie has lost many enterprises
located in the big cities which were seized by the Japanese
militarists and has suffered considerably from the pibgkg

by the Japanese army.
The Japanese are meting with ever greater difficulties in
finding the "personnel" for their puppet gwernments in
the districts they weupy.
E v a among the #*mese merchants, manufacturers and
financiers the Japanese puppet-producers cannot find a
single prominent personage willing to act as traitor to his
country, The middle and petty landlords, under the stress of
the barbarous policy pursued by Japanese imperialism, are
now expressing their sympathy for the war against Japan,
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and some of them m even ifcfpplyhg h p r t h ~
W
with food. The Japanese imperiatisb, h their
solidate their domination ia the regions they have d,
are W n g for support among the d o n a r y h d b d ~ ,
part of the gentry, some of the old militarists, the rnetcenary &cials and the d e c b e d elements, maKing we of their
T r o e t e agents for this purpose. b view of this, thc
Communist Far& of China, which has the interests of the
whole people at heart, is demanding a most determined
struggle against d traitors and agents of the Japmae
invaders.
The army and the civil population are displaying the
greatest hemism and selfless devotion in the struggle
against the Japanese aggressors, The Ehinese army, in spite
of its technid inferiority as compared with the Japanese,
offeredstubbrn, heroic resistance to the Japanese attack in
the bitter fighting for Shanghai, Nankow, Sinkou and Suchow. The world knows of the singIe b a t t a l i w b o n t 800
rnen-left in Shanghai during the evacuation of the Chinese
forces to cover. their retreat, ready to sawifice itself to the
last man. After the evacuation of the Chinese forces from
Shanghai this battalion, surrounded by the enemy, held out
for over a week of ceaseless fighting. The majority of this
battalion swceeded in heroically breaking through the enemy
ring. The splendid feats of Chinese airmen, of rankandfile soldiers, of whole divisions and brigades are common
knowledge.
The civil population too are fighting like heroes. In
Tientsin a Chinese chauffeur who was taken prisoner by
the Japanese and forced to drive a car under their orders,
ran it into the river at the price of his life. In Shansi and
Hop& peasants, masquerading as women, Ium Japanese
soldiers to where the partisans are lying in ambush, or,
after plying Japanese oRicers and soldiers with drirdr, seize
and disarm t h . These are not isolated instances; numerous
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cases could be dted of the heroic struggle waged by the
population in thc districts -piad
by the enemy.
The Chinese w o r k and white collar employees make
monthly derluetims from their pay for the natimal defense
fund. h s are known of Chinese citizens giving all they
possess for the defense of the country: dme rickshaw puller
contributed a handful of dollars--all he had mved in three
pars. Chinese tmipnts in America and other countries
activeIy and systematidly pllwt funds to help their
cowltry.
The Chinese people are realizing more and more profoundly the p v t daqpr that threateas their country, they
ate d n g to m x h e that tiae army done is nat enough to
bring victory over the enemy. Resistance to the Japanese
invaders is growing and so is the vigilance of the raasses.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITE AGENTS

OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

for
estabHshntent of naO tional unity isimportance
the oonsistent and determined
F ENORMOUS

the

struggle
which the Cwnmnnist Party of China is waging against the

Trotskyite agents of J-ese
imperialism. The Trotskyite
bandits in China are directing tbeir infamws activities
against the unity of the country, against the anti-Japanese
national united front, against collaboratirln &tween the
Cornmudst Party and the Kuomintang. The Trotskyite spies
and diversionists have a number of times a m t t d to pnetrate into the army, into the ranks of the Commmist Party,
the Kuomintang and other public organhations in order to
destroy the national united front from within, to help their
f h s t masters.
The Trotskyite bandit Ch;ung Mu-tao, who until his arrest
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by the Chinese 'autboritite was in the cmpby d the -Jw
nesemte.Uigmceserviaeanddvdfmmito~~al-1
of fifty to a hundred thowad dobm for the
Trakyitc m,
sent several Trobkyitcs into the Eighth
Route Army to engage in espionage and diskkqpting d v i t i s within it. However, the bandits were exposed. The invdgation mnhcted in this ase showed that the
did ewry&hg in their power to instigate desertion, to tmdermine the men's faith in the possibility of victory over
Japan, to brih the tecbnid personnel of the army in order
to obtain s t m t infomation on the disposition of the forces,
andsoon.
The Trotskyite spies also attempted to organize terrorist
groups for tEat p
m of asmsinatiug the leaders of the
Eighth Route Atmy. The J a p w e spies m the guise of
petty tmders often penttrate into the l d i h where units
of tbe Eighth Army are stationed and supply the Japanese
with i n f o d o n as to the movements of the forces, tbe
numerical strength of the tmop dispatto the front,
the available roiling st&,
and m on.
In Tientsin the Japan* .with the assisof the Chi- nese Trotskyites, mblbhed an espionage organization ader the name of the '%tern and Western Culture %ciety." In K m g s i the Trdqite. traitors tried to prevent
the dispatch of the provincial troop to the Shanghai front.
In H d o w they made raids on the editor's oftice and printing shop of the Cwnmunist paper. Not Ear from Suchow, the
Japanese set up a s p h l unit of spia and divusionists who
were to assist tbc Ja-e
troops in military ~ t i o n s
and in und~mmkiqthe Cbintse rear. This unit was a h fed
hy C&se 'Ikotdqita, who attunpted to esbblish -tact
with the Trotskyites in H&w
and Hongkong to seare
certain information for espionage purpom. In Homn
Province tbt Trotete T s h g Lu-ybg o q d d a bandit
gang from among the riffraff and the Russian whitqmrda
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ta fight against the Fourth Psoplels Revolutionary Army,
In Canton the Japanese agents, in March, 1938, attempted
to organize an uprising against the national government. The
uprising was exposed in time and the conspirators arrested.
The authoritim also exposed several traitors who had signaled to Japanese planes during the air raids on Canton.

In Singapore the Trotskyite provwateurs are doing everything in their power to prevent the Chinese Defense Loan
fmm being distributed among the large Chinese workers'
population living there, because they know that the latter
wholeheartdy support the struggIe which their people are
waging against the Japanese aggressors.
If is i m p i b l e to enumerate aU h crimes of this contemptible batld of underlings of Japan- imperialism.
The Communist Party and its press is playing an important part in exposing the Trotskyib as the direct agents
of the Japanese aggressors, as vile traitors to their cwntry.
With the help of a mudm of indispuhble facts the Comm\mist Party of China h proved to the masses of the
people that the Trotskyite bandits are hitors. The fact that
Chang Mu-tao, the leader of .the Trotskyite gang, was detained by the population and handed over to the authorities
is clear proof that the masses of the people have begun a
struggle against the Trotskyite traitors and fascist agents.
Individual Trotskyite spies sent to the Eighth Army and to
the Special District of the Chinese Republic were also exposed with the help of the men and of the J
d inhabitants.
The Trotskyite bandits in China ate a h d f u l of traitors
and spies who have no roots among the people. But they
are filled with hatred for the people and the republic and
are ready to commit any crime. That is why the struggle
against the Trotskyite bandib is one of the most decisive
factors making for victory over the Japanese invaders.
At the insistence of the,Comtnunist Party and ht accordance with the wishes of the masses of the people, the go..-36

I
i
E

ermatnt has i n b o d d punitive m r e s for c m p t 6
ciafs, traitors and saboteurs in the gave-t apparatus,
wfiich is also a considerable step forward in e o n s o ~ l h g
the unity of the Chinese people.

1

RE longer the war dmgs on, the better will China be
able to organize its forces, the greater will ;be its interrmitp, the better will its forms be trained and equipped
for the decisive c d k t , and the greater will be the d i E d tits confronting Japan. Thus a bng-drawn-out war is the
key to China's victory over be Japanese aggresmrs.
A Iengthy war will give. China a number of advantages
over the enemy. China possesses a vast territory, large natural resonfoes and inexhaustible reserves of man-power.
The fact that the J a m he seized part of its territory
and w r h h impmiant waters h not dishled Chioa from
developing further armed resistam. The oomplex topographid conditions favor the develapment of a powerftd
partisan movement in the districg occupied by the Japanese.
All the factors exist for increasing activity on tbe part of
the pputatioa in this war of liberation, for ever greater
i n t u unity and the creation of new forces and new re

T
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serves for a pmhged war.
In spite of its techria1 supriority,

the Japanese army a n
retain in its hards ody a narrow strip along the railways
and certain large cities, in which the rule of the J a p e s e
invaders L not stable. This ia due to the fact that the Jap
anese army is waging a war on foreign and hostile territory and that its man-power resemes are limited The -1
aad more scattered the Iine of the front, the more acutely is
Japan bound to feel the lack of its m-power and m a w
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A lengthy war wiil utterty exhaust Japan's finances at a

tirae whm its dependence on hqmh of stratepklly necessary raw materials -11s for iarge foreign currency reservcs.
In addition to the &if
and d
c d m , internal
h a 1 contradictions and anti-war smtiments are growing
in Japan among the population and in the army. Casts of
reservists refusing to join up on mobitiorz are becoming
more and more frequent. The wives and mothers of mowised soldiers are protesting against the dispatch of their
sons and husbands to the front.
These anti-war sentiments are having a profound effect
on the morale of the Japanese army. Desertion is on the
in; there are frequent ases of large groups of soldiers refusing to leave for the front and of Japanese soldiers
going over to the side of the Chinese army, sometimes in
whole groups, taking their arms with them. These are now
no longer isolated instances. There are scores of cases on
m r d of Japanese soldiers who prefer to commit suicide
rather than shed the blood of the Chinese peuple. A Japanese soldier by the name of Sikai who waa subsequently
killed at the front wrote home to his wife :

"I can't understand why I didn't receive your letters
for such a long time. Over six months have p-d
since we were driven here. At first we thought, and that's
what we were told, that after Shangb& would l~ taken
we would dl be sent home. But now nobody knows
when well get back. The supplying of food to us has
become far more difEcult. We have to requisition it from
the @ation.
Many of my friends have been killed.
God bows when it wit3 dl end."

hother Japmetx soldier in a lettet to his father wrote :
"It's a crud war l How much-1
will it d u e r'
hcmmts taken from the Japanese soldiers indicate that
tht Japanax anay ban Pltcady mobikd the sixth m e .
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The new replenishmetab, from the point of view of military
and techaid trahkg, are considerably worse than the regular army units.
Very often lea& published by the Communist Party of
Japan, the Proletarian Party, the Young People's Party and
other organizations are found on Japanese soldiers who are
taken prisoner or have been kiiled. One of these leaflets
states :

"More than zoo,ooo af our brothers have perished
in the fields of M h u r i a . They perished in the interests of the miiitarists, capitalists and landowners. We
must not let ourselves be duped by the a s i l i t a d and

. ..

financiers.
"Soldiers! Fricnds I T h e militarists are sending us to
a stwe death. We must rehl and in alliance with the
Chinese soldiers crush our real d e s - t h e Japanese
militarists and capitalists, and win eternal peace and
liberty on the Far-Eastern Asiatic continent !"

.

U n d W to fight, Japanese soldiers are escaping from
the army to the foreign oonceaions, or, dressed in civilian
garb, are hiding in the hills and villages, In the French
Concession in Shanghai there are two hundred Japanese soldiers who deserted from the m y , The district of Wusih
numbers 300 deserters and in the Shanghai district as a
whole this number swells to r,Soo. Swne who fail to desert
commit suicide. When the Chinese troops captured Lyang
they found in the local school the bodies of thirteen Japanese soldiers who had m i t t e d hari-kari. In Siehchiao
twelve Japanese soldiers banged themselves, in Tsiaochangmiao .ten, in Nanyanchiao rhree, and so forth.
Several -5
arc also m file of anti-mr actions among
Japanese units. In the middle of July a Japanese unit rc+
volted in Amay. Strect fighting book place between the
molting troops and the Japanese military police. On May
10, Colon& Yasida, Xssino, O W and ten soldiers were
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by c o u r t - m d d for anti-war actions
and 'Y=omanmiet propaganda." Since the beginning of the
war e,ooo Japmese soldiers have been committed for
trial for refusal to fight.
The heroic resistance of the Chinese people is having
direct effect on the movements of other nations subjected
by Japanese imperialism. The people of Korea and Formosa
are gradually taking up the struggle for their national
d p t i o n . Not so long ago b f u , the Ieadw of the
Formom workers, organized and led an uprising of 7,miners. As am k
the Japanese rear is checkered with
mines which axe gradually begianing to blow up.
A fact of considerable importanoe, one which serves to
strengthen the fareign poky position of Chiaa, is that the
forces of the dm&
front, fighting for the muse of
peace e n s t fascism md war, are &rowing daily throughout the world, that at &e head of this front stands the
mighty Soviet Unian-that grat friend of the Chinese people, that bulwark of pcace and d-.
The working
masses throughout h e world are expressing their solidarity
with China, wbich is fighting for its national independence
against the Japanese aggressors. They are rendering China
mnsidemble material assktaace.
The contradictions within the imprialist camp enable the
Chinese government to obtain the military supplies it needs
from G m t Britain, France, the U.S.A., and wen from
~ a p ' ally--Germany.
s
These are a11 very favorable circumstances for China,
But the most important and decisive condition for victorious
armed r e s i s m on the part of the Chinese people is unity
within the country, the mobilization of dl of China's nat i o d forces.
We must not, howeverI close our eyes to the dillimdties
and dangers that confrant the C h i n e RepubIic in the war
of defense that it is waging.
sentenced to be shot
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These didties are due maialy to tht aconomic back-.
wardness of Cbiria, which up to the p-t
time has had mo
war industry of its own; to tbe need for rearming and m
organizing the huge Chinese army k the mi&# of a uw;
to the inertia af the govemmmt apparatus which has not
yet been entirely overcome, and to the capitulatorp tendencies of the pmJapanese elements in certain circles of the
ruling party--the Kqomintang.
The maia task which confmnts China today is to create
and train new armed forces, to effect the unity of all the
progressive forces of the people, to organize without d&y
'a war industry and to improve tlie technic81 equipment of
the nat3onaI army as a whole as well as the partisan units.
The g u m t e e of the Chinese people's victory over the
Japanese invaders lies in a determined shuggIe against aH
defeatist and c a p i W o n vim and senlimmts, in overcoming possible vaulhtions in face of the inevitable difliculties, and in consolidating and extending the anti-fascist
national united front. Cbina has a long and difficultstruggle
ahead of her but an d y s i s of b t h .combatant forces red s that there can be no doubt of the ultimate victory of
the Chinese &E

THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIOHAL UNnED FRONT
AND

ITS TASKS

HE anti-Japanese national united fro*, established on
the initiative of the Communist Party, is the chief condition for victory over the Japanese aggresors and the
traasfomtion of Qzina into an independent, free, demo-

Its backbone is the lasting wbboratim between the two
most important and influential &es
in C h h - t h Kno-

mintang and the Communist Party. E s t a h M in 1937under the conditirms of the war of national l i b d o n , the
anti-Japanese mticlnal united front is the d t of the
unanimous demand of the whole of the people of China
who are striving for the unity of the country and who have
reabed that in unity lies China's main strength. And in
spite of the machinations of the enemies of tbe people of
Chi-the Trotskyites and other traitors, these agents of
Japanese i m p e r i a l i s ~ oundermine the united front, the
united front is growing in strength and breadth. Many national orgadations are now afhliated to the national uaited
front. The establishment of the united front has put new'
life into the activities of hundreds of work&, peasants'
and cultural organizations. The activities of these arganizations are now directed towards the defense of the fatherland, the improvement of the well-king of the masses and
the democratization of the country.
The anti-Jqpanese national united front in C h h is the
offspring of the people. Xis establishment was enthusiastically acclaimed by the population while its measures are
being ardently adopted by all organizations throughout the
country.

The history of the establishment of the national united
frmt, tbe history of the relations of the hva main parties
-the Kuomintang and the Communist Party--is briefly as
follows :
In September, 1937, the Communist Party of China published a p l a m a t i o n announcing the colIaboratiw of the
Kuornintang and the Communist Party; it reorganized tbe
Chinese Red Army into the Eighth Revolutionary People's
Army and fansformed the Soviet district of China into the
Special Ih'striet. After ten years of bloody war, the Ku*
Pnintang and the h u m m i s t Party oace again joined in
collaboration. But there is a difference between the d a b

4=

oration of the Communist Party and the K u c m h m tu O
existed 'm the 1-5-27 period of the Chinese Revol~tion
and as it eKisb now.
Whereas during 195-27&is whboration was based on
a joint struggle (at a certain stage) against the domhtiotl
of imperialism and against feudalism within the country,
the main purpose of the present
betwem the KW
mintang and the Communist
6ght foreign aggression, the -sion
of Japanese imperialism, for the
national independace and integrity of China. The prpose
of the present agreement is war against the foreign m a y ,
the Japanese aggressors.
The Kuomintang has passed through a number of stages
in the process of its evolution. At the time when the Communist Party collaborated with it in 1 g z 5 - ~the
, Kuomintang, as an organidon, represented a M m K:&the
national hurgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the glasses
of workers and pasants. At that time the K d t a n g
played a revolutionary part; it came close to the petty bourgeoisie and the wo-g
and v
t masses, which grida l l y ousted the influences of the Iaadlord and m i l i d s t
elements from its ranks. But after it receded from the rev*
lution in 1927, the Kuomintang adopted the line of struggle
against the Communist Party, the reactionary line of merging with the mititarists and landlords, who began to play
a dominant part in the Kuornintang, while the workers,
pasants and considerable d o n s of the petty bourgeoisie
left itir mks.
Later on, under the pressure of the masses of the peopIe
and the influence of the widespread national liberation movement which seized all the scchna of the Chinese pap4
the Kuominmg in 1936gradually began to resume the psitiw of a struggic for national liberation. As a result of this
change m its intermi and foreign poky, and a h of its m1labmation with the Communist Party, the progressive se+
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tion of the Kuominhng came to realiee the need fpr reorganizing the work of the latter, eliminating a number of
serious defects in ofgsmization and efiecting greater democracy within the party. The rank and & of the Kuomintang
have given active expression to their demand for democratizing the m,temoving the conservative and wdating
dements from its leadership and strengthening collabmation
with the Commtmist Party and all anti-Japanese parties
and groups.
The Cammunist Party of China has done its utmost to
support the progressive elements of the Kuomintang and
their efforts to purge tba Kuomintang of degenerate feudal
elements.
Wben the present war of defense began, the Kuomiatang
directed the central government of China, had a strong army
and a large prcss. The W u n i s t Wrty of China was in
contra1 of the territory of the Sviet District and guided
the Cfimese Red h n y .
The Communist Party has developed both ideologically
and o r g a d a t i d l y since the rev01utim of 1 9 5 - q . Its
political influence and prestige among the ptople of China
have cansiddly grown and consolidated.

"During the fifteen years of its existence," wrote
Comrade DirnitroiT in August, 1936,"the Communist
Party of China has grown up into a powerful M u tionary paw, steeled hthe fire of the Chinese revolution,
into one of the best Sections of the Comhtem. !'
Its leadership bas become stronger, the Party has k o m e
Bolshtvized, it has mastered the new strategy and t a c h
ensuing from the decisions of the Seven& Congress of the
Comintero and the actual situation in the camtry, and these
factors have been of decisive i m v for the developing

..
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and camtidating of the anti-Japanese mtiomal~Imit&R.glma
in existerm today.
It is not only the workers sad pmmds whu are taking
part in the war against J a m , but atso the pcqtJt bou+c
and the dd big bourgeoisie. In concluding its slgreemcnt with the K d - g , the Gmmunist Party was guZded
by the faodammtstl slogan: mEvrisingmust be sorbordb
atsd to the kXFk of
J W f Ail d d s mwt Bs
mdi the iGh# of thh p h d p d a d bariE task wrd M
be srrbo*dagd to it. The K W t a n g and the Commt~niSt
Party, joined in the d a a l anti-Japanese united front, are
acting on the bssis of a common p g m m , providing joint
l e a d d p and IPearing joint responsibility. What they axe
striving for is not to undermine each other by mutual
sttuggle, but, on the contrary, to facilitate eaeh other, to
avoid and mitigate any differences that may arise within
the national united front. Tht Communist Party insists that
aU omtbJapws8 parti= and groups be enlisted in active
w o k in the national united front.
of the Commuaist Party and the KuoThe
mintaq is t i a d on p m e d n g the d
in&
pendenee of tLtcsc @eg
and on freedom of criticism, the
latter to be friendly and not hostile in character. The collaboration of the parties in the national united front is
dimed, on the m e band, against m p W o n and compromise and, on the other, against sectarianism. It is on the
basis of t h e principles that the Communist Party of China
at tbe very beginning of the war of defense proposed colMmratiwl to the Kuominm, it is on the basis bf these
priaepfes that it hains its members, and it is these principles that it disseminates in the press and in its work of
agitation

h its appeal of l k c h l x r , 1937, the Communist Party
of China ddarcd that the mkboration of the Communist
Party with the KuaDnintang will be a lasting me, that tbey
45
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agree on collaboration not only for the time when t&stanCe
must be ohred to the Japanese aggressors, but will continue to collaborate after victory over the Japanese invaders,
in order by their joint darts to build up a d a m d i c China
The Trotskyite bandits, under cover of -gic
p b a
about unity, supported the proposal that the Cwnrmtaist
Party be 1iquidated-a proposal whiEh p r m d d fiom certain reactionary and aeemttive elemenh. The Tmtdqik
traitors, those direct agents of Japanese imperiatism, utilized for this work of pmvmatim both avowed adherents of
Japan aad people with little LU-I
of politics, who

i n t h i r d v c t C ~ t k i t h e ~ o f ~ p a r t i e 8
the Kmmintang m l d hmmse China's
Qghting d k i a q in the war against Japan.
The rCwnmmist Party has exposed the provocation that
underlies t h e attmpts. M
e Mao Tse-tung declared
in one of his speeches that the attempt to abolish the Communist Party on the paetRxt of establishing unity t the
country would ~e.tuaUyh w China back to the prearbus
s i W m that existed before the war pf defense began, before &*the progressive r u t i d forces of Chi= were
united, He pointad out that the cobbration whicb exi~ts
betwtea the Communist Party and the Kuomintang at the
present timc bas brought about the unity of all the d m ' s
form, united for armed resistance to Japan; thst the Communist Party is fighting to realize the Three Peopfe's Principles of Sun Yat-sen (nationalism, dmmcmcy and the
well-being of the people), which, far from contradicting
communism, are fully compatible with the convictions of the

and t r d s into

Conmunist Party.

Mao Tse-tung said :

'We are skiving far the r&on
of commuaism,
but at the present stage we are mnying out the natwnaldemmmtic revolution. And that is why the Com-

&

Party has advanced the slo@n of &dag tlgr "
anti-Japanese n a t i d united front and a t t a i d h w
cratic republic, As for r d i z i n g the mUae PeqWbi
Prinaples, the Cofourteen years ago, at the
fist Congress of the Ktiomintang, together with the
Kuomhtmg, adopted a decision that they should be
realized, and thae principles were being r e a 1 ' i in the
countq in 195-27both by tbe Communists and by the
Kuomintaug. But unfortunatdy the rupture of tbe
united front in r927 delayed the realization of Sun Yatsen's Thm People's Principles for ten y m .
"The policy which the Communists have pursued during these ten years corresponds on the wbofe to the
revolutionary spirit of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's
Principles. The Communists have never for a mmmt
abaadoned the struggle a&st @edim+m dthrrt
today is codstent d o d i m ; the Sopi& of feoplt's
Deputies are models of consistent democraq ;the agrarian revoIutim is undwbtedly o m of the d t i m
for improving the welfare af the people!'
lllrrrlist

..

Mao Tse-tung went on to explain m behalf of the whole
Party why the Communists have p m d e d from the work
of organizing Soviets b the slogan of a democtatic republic:
"The Chinese Cammunists, with the principle of
Marxism as their basis, developed a general program of
the first united front, a program of struggle for the
realization of Sun Yak-sen's Three People's RMpIc8,
and that is why the Communists duly proposed, st tht
moment when the memy kwdd m territory, when
the country's psitim bemne most d i i h l t , that a
national detaocrstic united front be tstabhhui, for that
was the only means of saving the countzy from doom."
True to the t-hings of Mam, Engels, Lenin and S&,
the C o d t Party of China is resolutely and m i s h t l y
khting for the mabation of the poky of the anti-Ja-e
n a t i d united f m t , a policy w W msuw fmm China's
47

present4ay situation and conform to Sun Yar-sen's Three
Prindple8.
As far back as x g r q Lenin, in an article entided "Demmmy and Narodism in China," exposed the elements of
Nutopia in Sun Yat-sen's tmddngs and platform,
but at the same time he pointed oat their vast progressive
dgdkncc for such a country as China.
"A militant, sincere spirit of demacracy," wrote Lenin, "pervades every line of Sun Yat-*s
platform. It
reveals a 'thorough appreciation of the inadequacy of a
'racial' revolution. It does not htray a trace of the
non-political spirit or of indifference towards politid
liw,or any admission ofthe idea that Chinese a u k -

racy is compatible with Chinese ' d a l . reform,' with
Chiaese constitutional reforms, etc. It is the expression
of complete democracy and the demand for a republic.
It directly presents the q u d o a of the conditions of the
masses, of the mass struggle; it expresses warm sympathy for the toilers and the exploited, belief in the
justice of their cause and in their strength.
"What we have before us is a really great ideology of
a really great people, which is able not only to bemoan
its age-long slavery, not only to dream of Iikrty and
equality, but is able also to fight the age-long oppressors
of China." *
Lenin characterized Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary democrat full of nobleness and heroism. Sun Yat-sen h i d f

fought for a united front between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party. As far back as the First Congress of the
Kuomintang in January, ~ g a aSun Yat-sen insisted on the
mity of action of these two political parties. He stressed
the necessity of this unity in his political testament to the
+ hnia, UDcmocmq and Namdism i o China,#* Ssiectd Works, Wol.
306, International, Publiltrs, New York.
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Kuombhg. The C h i n a Gommunists, adhering to the best
democratic traditions of their people, are striving their utmost
so that the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen be realty and
consistently carried out. They remember the m d s of Cotnrade Stah that

.

". . .
. ..

the strength of the national movement is determined by the degree-to which the wide strata of the
nation
partkipate in it+'' *

The policy of the Communist Party of China in estabIishiug a wide anti-Japanese national front met with support
among most of the pregressive elements in the country and
within the Kuomintang.
The recent Specid Congress of the Kuomintang, held in
March, 1938, and the session of tbe National Political Corncil w h i i was held some time later, marked a step forward
in matters of foreign and home policy and in the reorganization of the Kuomintang. The Congress proclaimed continued determined resistance to Japanese aggression, and
adopted a decision on anyhg out a number of d-tic
rnear;ures-freedom of s p e d , of the press and of assembly,
and the right of associatiepmvidad these activities were
in no way detrimental to the conduct of the war against
Japan. The Congress a h outlined measures for r e o q p i z ing the Kuotnintmg and a-ted
a decision of prime impor-.
t m c d e estabfishing of o National Politid Council. The
decision adopted by the Cmgress on organiring a national
revolutionary Chinese Youth League was also of great
importance.
No doubt exists that the measures outlined by the magress of the Kuomintang and the first sessioa of the National
Politid Council will ensure the f h e r growth of the forces
* J m h Strlin, M#&
m d tk Nirliond end Codonkt Q t ~ ~ r i m r ,
p. IS, Intcmaticmal FubZidKrq New York.
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of the great Chinese people, on condition, of course, that

. they be resolutely carried out.

As the war against j a p p d s , the coUabmtion betweeD h e Kuombtang and the Comtnunist Party will grow
and develop. The first year of the war has clearly proved
that only by co1labof;~tionbetween tbe Kuomintang and the
Communist Party w i U China be able to oBer successful resistance to Japanese aggression.
In his appeal to the pcopk and in the interview he gave
to foreign mespondcats on July 7, C h h g Kai-shek made
a number of weighty statements with regard to the necessity
of a still
understanding between the Kuomintang and
the Communist Party in the interests of uniting and saving
the country. A split between these two pdes would mean
inevihbIe defaat for C h k in the war against Japan. The
Japanex imperialists, the pro-Japanese ia China, the traitors
and Trotskyite bandits are doing their atmost to undermine
the unity and solidarity of China, and, first and foremost,
to dmlish the collaboration between the Kuomintang and
the Comrndst Party. Japanese imperiafim is straining
every n e r ~ eto undermine this mlhbratim. It is therefore
the duty of the Chinese p p I e to strengthen to the utmost
the solidarity of the national united front and to manifest
greater vigilance to the wreckhg work of the agents of the
Japanese imperialists.
The Communist Party of China is centering its attention
primarily on organizing the broad rnasseMbat solid foundation of the united front.
Owing to the establishanent of the anti-Japanesenational
united f rmt, the Communist Party was enabled to revive
legal activities in a number of provinces and cities of China.
The Par,ty organizations in the provinces of Shansi, Shensi,
Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Szechwan are very active, and often play the lding pari in the
partisan movement and the mass organizations. At the pres50
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giving special attention to
mnrolidating its mars work among the workers and to extending the influence of the national united front to the
trade union organizations. The Red trade unions are now
joining the Kuomintang trade unions and the Communists
are q i n g on much agitation and- explanatory work to
d
t new members fox these unified trade unions.
Communists are working actively in the rear of the Jawnese-in the districts they have mcupied. In these districts
t
m the ammrmist o q d z a t i w s arc following the line of a
national united front, orpizing student unions, women's
orgmbtims, ,Weties of Nationat Satvation, various other
mass organhtiotls and armed defense units.
The Commm*st Party is continuing its persistent struggle
for purging the ~~t
apparatus of pro-Japanese traitois, for enlisting the progressive forces of the country in
active work, These means will serve to improve datims
between the central government and the lmal authorities and
to bring tbt gavernrnerrl even closer to the broad masses nf
fheppuhti~~~.
S-sfuf
cdalmation ktween the Kuomintang and
the Communist Party makes possible the further democratization of the camtry and improved f untioning of the government apparatus. All these activities of the national antiJapanese united front are subordinated to a single goal, a
single hskthe defensive effwiency of Qlina,
welding the a m y with the people, building up reserves,
training q&ed
and politically reliable cadres for the army.
The basis of the anti-Japanese national united front in
China is extending more and more, the anti-Japanese movement is drawing in ever new masses of the population.
There a k no doubt that the longer the war of defense
drags out, the grmter will be the will of tbe Chkme people
to resist, the greater will be its organized forces.
Not to retreat &fore difficuIties,but to &ee
ever new
ent time the Communist Party is

forces of the nation so as to achieve complete victory over
the Japanese vultures-such is the- main fogan of the
Chlnese
'
masses.

of Asia, and in the Far West of Europe
in S & A e flames of war are raging,
the
pirstes. This is a war of the fascist
brigands against the libwty and independof the peoples,
against universal peace.
The Spanish and Chinese p e o p l d e vanguard in the
struggle against world xeaction and farrcismre courageously defending not only their own national independence
but also the cause of the whole of advanced and progressive
humanity. On their side is the a r d a t sympathy of the
broad masses of the people, of all honest people thro~~~ho&
the world. Fascism is plotting ever new villainies against
the p~opIe.

East
Ikindled China
and
by
fascist
N THE Far

-in

"If the Japanese fascist miIitatists succeeded in subjugating the people of China," states the manifesto of
the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, "it would signify an unparalleled
intensification and expansion of fascist aggression both
in Asia and the Pacik Ocean as well as in Europe and
in other parts of the world. On the other hand the victory of China wiU h a strong blow at the predatory
plans of all fascist aggressors. Thus the war of liberation of the Chinese people is a vital, integral part of
the general struggle of the world proletariat and the
whole of progressive mankind against the tyranny of
badmian fascism."

The war of national liberation which the Chinese people
are waging against the Japanese aggressors is already in its
second year. Hundreds of thousands of citizens of China
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have given their lives defending their country from tl~@
depredations of these vandals. The fruits of many centuriedF
of labor have been destroyed by &e Japanese invaders. In
the occupied districts the Japanex have instituted a reign
af terror, of bloody mrnage and mass daughter.
But during this year of war the Chinese people have
achieved what they Iacked most-unity, a
h
te rallying of their
forces. The experience of the past year has shown that the
Japanese invaders will not achieve what they set out to d+
to turn China into their colony.

"The country is now united," declares Mao Tx-tung,
"and we enjoy the sympathy and support of the dem*
cratic forces throughout the world. . Our forces, our
might will undoubtedly grow in the process of the
struggle.
China ean never be destroyed no matter
wbat foxes Japan puts into the field."

..

...

The Chin= p p l e feel the suppart of the working peo-

ple and all sineere democrats throughout the world. mima

--confident in its strength-is fighting for liberty, for the
liberty of the whole of mmkind.
The further support of China on the part of the whole
of advanced and progressive -kind
will not only inspire
the people of China still more and serve as a pIedge of the
victory of m a , but also be a valuable contribution to the
cause of the struggle for peace throughout the world.

APPENDIX
INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MAO-TSE TUNG TO MR. WA#G KUNGTAII,
CO-PONDEMT

OF THE ASSOCIA-

PRES

w
1938, Mr.Wang Kungid, correspondent
IYenan
of
Arnerimn Assdated Press Agency,
and obtained an interview with Mao Tse-tung, The
a

FEBRUARY,

the

arrived in

of the interview, as r e e d e d by W q Kung-tab and
approved by Mao Tse-tung, was published in the C h i g h f w
(Liberation), the organ of the Commttnist Party of C h i ,
in its issue of May 5, rg38, No. p.
QvestiPrr: At the p-t.
mommt many people regard the
prospects of China waging a war of defense with pessimism.
What is your opinion ?.
A-:
I am inclined to be optidtic. Reverses and successes are bound to alternate in a war of defense : first there
may be defeats, then victory is won. The side that is w d
II t
a. the outad later proves to be rho-uch
is the usual,
establish& trend of development.
During the first period of the war between Japan and
China we cwld describe the general situation by saying
that Japan was strong and China was weak. But from now
on the position will be different: Japan's weak spots will
gradually be disclosed and will grow, whiIe China's forces
will gradualIy increase and consolidate. Japan just now is
agam resorting to floating a loan. In the six months that
it waged war in 1937J a p spent a,sm,oooloao yen; it is
said that this year Japan will spend another 4,um,,000,mo
yen, but actually this S u m will probably be m r . This is
text
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p t l y undermining the n a t b d shxngth of Japan even
now. Her international credita are falling, her state loans
arc d,her plan of swift war and swift victory"
has met with defeat.
T k posifioa ai tiis front. China's front extends from
Hangchow to Paoteh-+ distance of several thoustnd Ii.*
The Japanese are short of form to d e f d the front. Thus
the further they penmate into China, is., the longer the line
of the front m a d s , the weaker the Ja-e
forces become.
Japan bas seized a numkr of railway lines in Wna, but
it has to post troops to guard every station. Japan has already mobilized a third of its military forces for the war
of @on
in C h k If it wants to seize Hankow, Canton
and othcr cities it wiU ha% to motriliee at least several htmdred thousand more men, and then its position will be very
precarious, Thisi s the more inevibble sin& Japan is faced
not only with China. The -tion
of Japan$ inter+-

tionalandin~~~isalsoafactotthatwiH
help to send Japan inevitably to her d m .
conQtfesrio#: Do you d d e r that China's forces
stantly -?

A m : Judging from the experiof the last few
month, we can say tbat if we
in correctly coordinatiug three types of war-tmtical, trench and p w h n warfart+the enemy's fomwill inwitably find themselves in
a very difficult position. In my opinion, what we must do
now is organize a few more strong route armies numbering
two to three hunched thou=nd picked men, deliver mushing
blow8 to the advance guards of the enemy with the aim of
destroying them by mmemerhg tactics; in addition eighty
to ninety thousand reffclEar army men should be assigned to
form twenty or thirty well-trained p a r k rt?giment~.Each

of these highly trained regiments could consist of three or
four thousand men.
These regiments should be given resolute and self-reliant
commanders, political work in them should k improved, and
they should be dispatched to the front between Hangchow
and Paoteh. These regiments must use the breaches that
would form in twenty or thirty spots along such an enormously extended frmt, in order to penetrate into the rear
of the Japanese army. And if they act correctly, they will
succeed in uniting with the population and setting up innumerable small partisan units; they will be able to estiblish
anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, rouse tens of millions
of people, and provided they correctly cuordinate their actions with the flanking operatiis of the regular armies,
create insuperable obstacles for the enemy.
As regards k c h warfare, if cannot Rrve as the main
form of operations at the present time on account of our
inadequate equipment, We must b d d up a defense industry
of our own, so as to produce heavy armaments and antiaircraft guns ourselves. At the same time we must take
every step to import armaments from abroad, for they
are indispensable in trench warfare. And we must wage
energetic trench warfare, both defensive and offensive in
nature.
Some people say that we advocate only partisan warfare.
That is nonsense. We have always stood for coordinating
tactical, trench and partisan warfare. At the present time
tactical warfare is our main form of operations and the
dher two are auxiliary. In the future we must work hard
to coordinate tactical with trench warfam. Partisan warfare
has always been and wiIl be an auxiliaty form. But in a national liberation war in a semi-colonial country, particularly
such a country as China, with its vast territory, partisan
warfare will undoubtedly form a wry important part of
strategy.
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The coaatry is now united, and we enjoy the:and sup+ of the demmtic f m tbughmt the
But the unity we have achievd is not get s&chnt; we muSe
msoridate and extend it. haeasing the country's r d b q
and politid might is an indiqxmable condition far victory,
Our forces, our might will undoubtedly grow in the pxocess
of
forethe
us.struggle. Such are the bright prospects we aee be-

I

'1

Questbs: Does the Eighth Route Army stand in danger
of king entirely summded by the Japanese and wouId not
the htter in this way be able to rout or even utterly destroy it?
A m r : At tbe present time the Eigbth Route A m y 4s
waging a widespread pastruggle in the following four
large districts:
T h e 6m district covers the Iodity traversed by four
raifways-t.he P e i ~ H h w P+i-Siyuan,
,
Chengting-Taiyuan and Tatpg-Mow r a i I w a y ~ n dthe regions
adjoining it on the north and a t . This district is inhabited '
by a population of IS,who are fighting vigorously
against Japanese imprialism. They are all closely connected
with the Eighth Army. This &district ie one of the most important centers of resistaaEe to Japan, and rhere the Eighth
Army is already M y established. At present the enemy is
intensifying o W v e o p e d m in this district, but nevertheless i t d not be able to dislodge the Eighth Amy, let
alone destroy it. A nuhber ofd t s of the Eqhtb A m y acting Independently are atready approaching the region of
the Tientsin-Pukow railway.
The second district covers the northwestern &rt of
Shansi--the districts to the south of the Peiping-Suiyuan
railway, to tlq west of the northern sector of the TatungPuchow d w a y , and to the east of the H d g - h o River.
The third district cover6 the southeaskern part of Shansi
and the snuthwestern p r t of Hopeh Province, that is, the

SF

districts lying between the PeipingaHankuw, ChengthgTaiyuan and Tatung-Puchow railways.
T b fourth district fia in the southwestern part of S h i
Province.
The Eighth Army everywhere acts in close contact with
the 1-1
popdation and constantly cuts the lines of cammunication in the rear of the Japanese troops. It has already
won a large number of major and minor victories and has
considedly reduced the enemy's offensive force. In these
districts China has lost only a number of railways and certain cities, raining the rest. This example graphidly
proves that if it adheres to this method of warfare China a n
never be destroyed no matter what forreg Japan puts into
the field. The districts now occupied by the Eighth Amy
will continue to serve as a powerful center for launching a
wunter-uffensive against the Japanese m y and for a
stwggIe to M w e China's lost tenit6ry.
Qwrsfiotr: Do you think that the =sent collaboration between the Kuornintq and the Commdst Party will be
' h&g?
A s : Yes, I do. The split that took place betwe& the
Kuornintang and the Communist Party in xgsa;r was against
the Communist Party's will. The Communist Party never
wanted a split with the Kuomintang. During the last tm
yean, the Kuomintang, the Communist P&y and tbe entire
Chinese nation have been taught by bitter exprience where
division of forces lads. This exprieaee will undoubtedly
help us to become still more united. The p q m e of our
present and future colhboration is a joint struggle against
Japan& aggrdon and joint work in developing the country. Tf we o b s e ~ ethese conditions, if the parby with which
we mow have friendly relations is as sinas o u d v e s ,
our coIlaborstion, cwtrolled by all the people of China, will
naturally be of a I d n g aatare.
Question: In its declaration on the situation in C h the

5s

a

b

Communist Party p m h h e d that the pwpme of
tion between the Kmintang and thc Gumn&
Xaartp ia
not on~yto wage a joint struggle qpimt ~aprnae~ g s
sion but also jomt work in developing the -by
after
victwy over the aggressors bas been achieved. The question
arisea, however, how two parties can oollaborate in
dwelopmg the new state if they represent two different

classes.

Anmwr: China is s s e m i - c o l d country, its exis-

as

a nation is endangered. Nay, more, China is faud with tbe
danger of being t m e d into a colony of Japanese imperialism. And though Merent parties represent different

-,

I

their situation under the prevailing conditions is alike. As
a result they can c o b r a t e not only in the struggle again^
the Japanege aggrrasols, but in developing the c-try
as
well. However, their d l a ~ t i o must
n
k based on a definite program. It must be based on principle, and productive
of results, not forced and format, No political party following de6rite principles wouId allow tbat. Glhboration based
on a definite program and prindples resembles the heartfelt friendship of genuine friends. Only such a heartfelt
friendship can be lasting.
Qwsh'on: How do you picture the democratic republic
a d v a t e d by the Communist Party 7

A w : In the. democratic republic which the Communist
Party adv-s,
will be elected by our people,
who refuse to be coloaiaI slaves. Elections will be basd on
universal sufIrage without any restrictions. Ours will be a
demoeratic s y e . In bmad outline it will be that state on
whose establishment Stm Yat4en insisted long ago, It is
along these lines that the Chinese state must develop.
Quustion: Is the Communist Party partytided with the present central government ? Does it consider a provisianal National Assembly necessary?
Anmwr: We support the present central government since

~~
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it is pursuing a determined plicy of struggle against Japanese aggression and is heading armed resistance to Japan.
But we hope that this governmeat will be atended and enlarged, ahd that certain necessary reforms will be carried
out in its borne poIicy so that this policy may even more
effectively further the interests of the war of defense. We
have proposed the convocation of a provisio~al National
Assembly, advocated im his t h e by Sun Yat-sen, since we
think that it would further national unity and would increase
our forces in the war of national defense. We are ready to
do everything that really answers the interests of the war
of defense.
Qweshn: Is the Communist Party of China directing the
struggle against Japan waged by the volunteer army of the
three northeastern provinces (Manchuria) ?
A m v r : It is true that the Communist Party of China
has established close contact with the volunteer army operating in the northeastern provinces of China. Thus, for instance, Ymg Tsin-yiu, Chao, Shan Chi, Li Kun-hen and
other prominent leaders of the volunteer army are Communists. The successes they have achieved in organizing
determined resistance to Japan are generally known. In
these provinces too a national united front is now being
realized. Besides the Communists there are also other groupings-various military unia and mass organizations. They
have already united on the basis of a common program of
action.
Qwsbion: What is your general opinion of the position
adopted by the U.S.A. with regard to the Bpano-Chinese
war?
A m : The support that democracy in the U.S.A. is giving the muse of internatid peace, the condemnation of
fascism by President Rmsewlt; the sympathetic attitude of
the American papers towards the resistance that China is
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a&rbg to Japan aad, in particular, the support the masses
of the h e t i c a n *pie are giving the Cbinese people in
their struggle &st
J a w this we w b m e and are
grateful for to the American m e . But we hope that the
U.S,A, will go further, tbat it will mite with 0th- states
to wage. a p r a U struggle against aggrewom. It is time
for China, the U.S.A. and all other states fi*
against
aggressors to units for the purof &sting the enemies
ef universal peace.

DECURATIQN BY COMMUNISTS, MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
MLITZCAL CQIINCIL OF CWHA

Hsiu Huu JJk Pap has published a letter by Mao
se-tung, Wang Ming, Tsing Pan-sing, Lin Chu-han,
Wu Y u i k , Tung Pi-wu and Teng Yin-chao, the Cammunist P t y of C b d s represenwives on the National Political G d .
HE

TIT

The letter states :

"We,seven members of the Communist Party, b v e h e n
approd as m e m h of the National Political Couad Tk
Central Committce of the Communist Patty of China bas
d o n e d our acceptance a£ the gowmnent appointmat.
The establishment of the Nationd Political Council daring
the war of liberation evinces tfrat the paLiti-l life of China
is pmgmsiogtowards demmaq and that the united front
of the parties and the people is dwIophg still further.
Mthwgb the Cmcil, both in the m e h d whereby it was
established and in its amposition, is not yet an aWuteIy
representathe body of the people, nevertheless, its authority
and functions in uniting a11 the forces for armed rdstmm
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the enemy show that in its political life China is more
and more effeaively Moping as a demaracy.
' W e Communists, having in mind the posdbiity of deyeloping thc Council: into a genuine h d y of people's representativts, will enthmhtically aad sincery partidpatt in
its work. We p u m e that our active partiaption in the
Council will facilitate strengthening the forces of defense
of the Wuchang aties (Hankow, Hanyang and Wucba~&.
"The purpose of the Communist Party of China in paxticipating in the Council is to colkhrate with the Kuomintang and other parties and groups in wder to carry out the
concrete proposals and measures which aim at achieving conlpIete victory in the war of national likation. The representatives of the C d s t Party will cooperate with other
parties and groups so as to defeat the Japanese invaders and
mate the foundation of an independent, free and happy
new chin@".
"In order to acbieve this aim tbe fighting cap& of the
army at the front must be strengthened and guerilla warfare conducted on a still larger d e . The. p o f i h l apparatus
must be reorganized, the formation of popular organizations in the various provinces must be encouraged, the
masses must be orgaanized and mobilized in order to take an
active part in the armed resistance. In the sphere of the
national economy: national defense industries must k established rapidly, finances mast be improved, industrial oatput increased and effective measures must be adopted tcl
improve the conditions of life of the people. The growth
and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front will depend on the application of all these measttres."
to

In conclusion the letter states :

"The Communist members of the Council do not repudiate responsibility on the pretext that the members of the
Council are not elected by the people. We d
t deeply
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that the mePabers of the Mare the emants of the
-14
consequently m will reaaldy strive tu r u e the
d&,hqmanddemmds
of the peopleof China. Tim
unanimous demand of the peopfe is that national d t y be
bimngkned and the Japanese inmima drmcn out of
China. We hope that our fellow
will as& us
and criticize 'usif we commit any m
i
.
We bope tbat all
the m e m h of the Council will f
a
1
1tke d&m of 9ur
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